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TURNING WISCONN VALLEY INTO THE 
NEXT SILICON VALLEY: REFORMING 
WISCONSIN NON-COMPETE LAW TO 
ATTRACT HIGH-TECH EMPLOYERS 
The July 2017 arrival of Taiwanese tech-giant Foxconn and the 
establishment of the Wisconn Valley Science and Technology Park in Wisconsin 
reflects a larger trend in the United States to reinvent the nation’s 
manufacturing economy with high-tech production.  High-tech employers have 
substantial interests in retaining employees in order to protect their valuable 
proprietary information and market share.  Non-compete agreements, also 
known as restrictive covenants or covenants not to compete, are often the legal 
device used to secure these interests.  This Comment argues that to attract and 
retain employers in the tech industry, Wisconsin should reform its non-compete 
law by adopting new statutory language and exercising judicial restraint that 
reconciles conflicts of interest between employers, employees, and the public. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he single largest economic development project in the history of 
Wisconsin.”1  A “game changer.”2  “[A] home run for Wisconsin.”3  
“[S]omething so special.”4  These are a small sampling of the reactions to 
Taiwan-based Foxconn’s July 2017 announcement that the tech-giant would 
invest ten billion dollars in Wisconsin by constructing an ultramodern LCD 
manufacturing plant and establishing its North American headquarters in the 
state.5  The move also inspired the creation of the Wisconn Valley Science and 
Technology Park.6 
The plan, and its reception, reflects a larger trend in the United States to 
reinvent the nation’s manufacturing economy with high-tech production.  
While the U.S. maintains the world’s strongest research and development 
culture, it has failed to focus on the production of the high-value technologies 
it creates.7  This “innovate here, produce there” 8 model has resulted in serious 
 
1. Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Foxconn Announces $10 Billion Investment in Wisconsin and 
up to 13,000 Jobs, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2017/07/26/scott-walker-heads-d-c-trump-prepares-wisconsin-
foxconn-announcement/512077001/ [https://perma.cc/SZ3S-G4HB].  This quote was given by 
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker on July 26, 2017.  Id. 
2. Id.  This quote was given by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan on July 26, 2017.  Id. 
3. Id.  This quote was given by White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus on July 26, 2017.  Id. 
4. Donald Trump, President, U.S., Remarks at Foxconn Facility (June 28, 2018).  This quote was 
given by President of the United States Donald Trump on June 28, 2018.  Id.  
5. Lulu Chang, Foxconn is Coming to America — More Specifically, to its New Milwaukee HQ, 
DIG. TRENDS (June 17, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/foxconn-milwaukee/ 
[https://perma.cc/P3DM-YZT4].  
6. See Michael Burke, Wisconn Valley, Early Stages, Taking Shape, J. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://journaltimes.com/business/local/wisconn-valley-early-stages-taking-shape/article_e1484360-
2af6-5cdf-94b2-93b6f138b222.html [https://perma.cc/2LYF-DJTC].  “The Wisconn Valley Science 
and Technology Park will . . . serve as a science and technology park to promote research and 
development in advanced technologies in areas such as cloud computing, mobile devices, Internet of 
Things, Big Data, artificial intelligence (AI), networks, and robotics and automation . . . .  In addition, 
it will serve as an industry internet platform to enable hundreds of thousands of small and medium size 
manufacturers to be part of the advanced manufacturing in the Midwest and in America.”  Press 
Release, Foxconn, Foxconn and U.S. Leaders Celebrate Groundbreaking of Wisconn Valley Science 
and Technology Park (June 28, 2018) (on file with Urban Milwaukee).  The hub has also inspired the 
Wisconn Valley Venture Fund, which will invest in high-tech startups and manufacturing.  Rick 
Romell & Sarah Hauer, Foxconn, Advocate Aurora Health, Johnson Controls and Northwestern 
Mutual Create $100 Million Venture Fund, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2018/08/28/foxconn-advocate-aurora-health-
johnson-controls-and-northwestern-mutual-create-100-million-venture-f/1124290002/ 
[https://perma.cc/TU55-YXT3].  
7. William B. Bonvillian, Donald Trump’s Voters and the Decline of American Manufacturing, 
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 2016 at 27, 34. 
8. Id. at 37.  A primary example of this model is Apple Inc.  Id.  Apple leads the world with 
dramatic technological innovations but sends virtually all its production to Asia.  Id. 
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consequences.9  From 2000 to 2010, manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell 
from seventeen million to under twelve million, a decline of almost one-third.10  
Moreover, the employment trends of this decade were accompanied by drastic 
declines in manufacturing investment, output, and productivity.11  In contrast, 
countries like Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and China use their experiences in 
manufacturing to inform their research and development, closing gaps in their 
innovation processes.12 
To address the U.S.’s manufacturing shortfalls, thereby strengthening the 
economy and generating technological innovations, advanced manufacturing 
jobs are needed.13  Advanced manufacturing jobs are highly skilled, involving 
both the production of advanced technologies and innovative ways to 
manufacture existing products.14  One Foxconn official estimates two-thirds of 
the promised 13,000 new jobs will be highly skilled positions.15  Wisconsin, 
luckily, has anticipated this necessity and already begun training a capable 
workforce.  Publicly, Wisconsin has invested hundreds-of-millions of dollars 
in workforce development through programs such as Wisconsin Fast Forward 
(WFF).16  The WFF alone allocates 500,000 dollars of grants annually for 
technical education in advanced manufacturing fields.17  Privately, companies 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 31. 
11. Id. 
12. WILLIAM B. BONVILLIAN & PETER L. SINGER, ADVANCED MANUFACTURING: THE NEW 
AMERICAN INNOVATION POLICIES 8 (2017). 
13. SUBCOMM. FOR ADVANCED MFG., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING: A SNAPSHOT OF PRIORITY TECHNOLOGY AREAS ACROSS THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT iii (2016). 
14. Id. at 2 n.1. 
15. Rick Romell, Foxconn Will Need Thousands of Workers with Entry-Level Skills and a High 
School Diploma, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2018/05/04/foxconn-need-thousands-workers-entry-
level-skills/578022002/ [https://perma.cc/6H7B-WHWF].  These positions include, software 
engineers, data scientists, IT specialists, technical writers, and high-performance computing 
developers.  Specialized Hiring, FOXCONN, 
https://recruiting.adp.com/srccar/public/RTI.home?c=2175907&d=ExternalCareerSite 
[https://perma.cc/J9F4-BLUF] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).  
16. OFFICE OF SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., Expanded 
Wisconsin Fast Forward Program: Advanced Manufacturing Technical Education Equipment Grants: 
Grant Program Guidelines, 1 (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://www.wisconsinfastforward.com/pdf/18_19_adv_mfg_tech_edu_equip_grant_program_guideli
nes.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH87-YP5M].  
17. Id.  Grants from 5,000 to 50,000 dollars are awarded to Wisconsin schools “for the 
acquisition of equipment used in advanced manufacturing fields in the workplace, together with any 
software necessary for the operation of the equipment and any instructional material necessary to train 
pupils in the operation of the equipment.”  Id.  The grant program’s guidelines admit to Wisconsin’s 
skilled worker shortage and need to prepare students for success in a “modern, global, and competitive 
economy.”  Id.   
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such as Direct Supply18 and Northwestern Mutual19 have partnered with 
Milwaukee universities to establish talent pipelines in technology fields.  But, 
is there a legal design that could be implemented in Wisconsin to attract and 
retain tech employers? 
Once tech employers hire highly skilled employees, two important 
considerations arise.  First, how can the employee be retained to prevent the 
employer’s investment in him or her to benefit a competitor?  Second, how can 
the employer’s proprietary information shared with the employee be protected?  
Non-compete agreements, also known as restrictive covenants or covenants not 
to compete, are often the solution.20  This Comment argues that to attract and 
retain employers in the tech industry, which is vital for growth, Wisconsin 
should adopt new statutory language21 and exercise judicial restraint that 
reconciles interest conflicts between employers, employees, and the public.22 
This Comment proceeds as follows.  Part II examines non-compete 
agreements generally and in Wisconsin, providing a fundamental 
understanding of the current law and its function in practice.23  Part III delves 
deeper into the use of non-compete agreements by tech employers.24  This Part 
will also analyze California’s and Massachusetts’ approaches to non-compete 
 
18. Kathleen Gallagher, Direct Supply Opens Technology Center at MSOE, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (Sept. 4, 2012), http://archive.jsonline.com/business/direct-supplty-opens-technology-
center-at-msoe-mv6o6ba-168516006.html/ [https://perma.cc/WJ68-74WG].  In 2012, Direct Supply, 
Inc., a provider of equipment and information systems to the senior living industry, opened a 
technology center on the campus of the Milwaukee School of Engineering.  Id.  The center houses 
dozens of engineers and students and was described as a “key resource” in the company’s attraction 
and development of tech talent in Milwaukee, WI.  Direct Supply Opens Technology Center at 
Milwaukee School of Engineering, LEADING AGE (quoting Bill Avery, Executive Vice President and 
Chief Information Officer of Direct Supply), https://www.leadingage.org/direct-supply-opens-
technology-center-milwaukee-school-engineering [https://perma.cc/UM3T-PREN] (last visited Oct. 7, 
2019).  
19. Nick Williams, Northwestern Mutual, Marquette and UWM Partner on $40M Data Science 
Institute, MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2018/06/20/northwestern-mutual-marquette-and-
uwm-partner-on.html [https://perma.cc/HZ8A-GP5T].  Northwestern Mutual, a Milwaukee-based 
insurance giant, agreed in 2018 to not only partner with and provide office space for students and 
innovators of Marquette University and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, but also to invest 
fifteen million dollars in data science education and research.  Id.  The universities will also each 
contribute twelve million dollars in efforts to address Wisconsin’s tech needs.  Id. 
20. In a 2011 study, nearly half of survey respondents belonging to the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers said they had been asked to sign a non-compete agreement.  Matt Marx, The 
Firm Strikes Back: Non-compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. 
SOC. REV. 695, 702 (2011). 
21. See infra Appendix A. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. See infra Part III. 
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agreements in relation to the states’ respective tech climates.25  Finally, Part IV 
offers summary analysis and provides detailed recommendations based on the 
findings of previous sections.26 
II. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
A. Generally 
Non-compete agreements have existed in the common law tradition for 
hundreds of years.27  The agreements typically have three provisions designed 
to reduce economic harm to the employer:  
(1) the “noncompetition” provision, which prevents an 
employee from engaging in activities that may, or do, compete 
with the employer (e.g., working for a competitor or opening a 
competing business); (2) the “nonsolicitation” provision, 
which looks to restrict the employee from soliciting the 
company’s other employees or customers; and (3) the 
“nondisclosure” or “confidentiality” provision, which seeks to 
limit an employee’s unauthorized use of confidential, 
proprietary, or trade secret information.28 
As for the enforceability of these provisions, fundamentally courts have 
balanced two interests throughout the agreement’s history: (1) the interest of 
the business owner in protecting his or her information and customers from 
immoral competitors and employees; and (2) the interest of the employee to 
move freely and follow his or her own interests.29  How courts balanced these 
 
25. See infra Section III.B. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960).  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century when guild associations dominated economies, most highly 
skilled jobs were artisanal in nature and apprentices were expected to eventually become masters 
relying on the knowledge they acquired.  Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, 
Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 441, 450 (2001).  This master-apprentice relationship inherently protected trade secrets 
as apprentices pledged to keep techniques secret in return for instruction.  Id. at 451.  Thus, non-
compete agreements were not a factor in most of the highly skilled employment market.  See id.  As 
the nineteenth century went on, the industrial economy replaced the craft economy, gradually changing 
the rules surrounding the dissemination of knowledge.  Id.  The norms of guilds persisted, however, as 
these rules developed.  Id. at 454–55.  For example, given the importance of practicing a trade to an 
artisan’s livelihood, the early laws reacted with hostility to non-compete agreements.  Id. at 455.  
However, the potency of these norms declined with time, and by the turn of the twentieth century, non-
compete agreements were relatively common as courts recognized and defined employer property 
interests.  Id. at 493.  
28. Robert J. Orelup & Christopher S. Drewry, Judicial Review and Reformation of Noncompete 
Agreements, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2009, at 29, 29. 
29. Blake, supra note 27, at 627. 
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interests over time ebbed and flowed with the period’s social values and 
business norms, but eventually resulted in a reasonableness standard.30   
Sometimes referred to as the “rule of reason” test, modern courts generally 
consider the employer’s interests and the impact of their enforcement on the 
employee’s interests and the public’s welfare when determining whether the 
scope of the non-compete agreement is reasonable.31  Additionally, factors such 
as duration, geographic scope, and scope of the employee’s limitations may be 
considered to determine reasonableness.32 
When a non-compete agreement is found to be unreasonable, state courts 
vary in their response.33  Some states modify the agreements, rewriting sections 
of employment contracts if necessary, while others will only strike 
unreasonable provisions and enforce the rest—the so-called “blue-pencil 
doctrine.”34  Still others follow a strict no-modification approach or, in the case 
of two states, presumptively void non-compete agreements all together.35 
B. In Wisconsin 
The primary source of non-compete authority in Wisconsin is section 
103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes.36  According to this statute: 
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete 
with his or her employer or principal during the term of the 
employment or agency, or after the termination of that 
employment or agency, within a specified territory and during 
a specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the 
restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the employer or principal.  Any covenant, 
described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the 
covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.37 
 
30. Id. at 626–27. 
31. J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: 
The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 379 (2016). 
32. Orelup & Drewry, supra note 28, at 29–30. 
33. Id. at 30–44. 
34. Id. at 30–31. 
35. Id. at 31–32.  The two states that do not permit non-compete agreements are California and 
North Dakota. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2019). 
36. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2015–2016).  The statute was enacted in 1957 in response to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, where the court upheld part 
of what the legislature deemed to be an overly broad non-compete agreement.  Heyde Companies, Inc. 
v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, ¶ 11, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830. 
37. WIS. STAT. § 103.465. 
 
KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:52 PM 
2019] WISCONSIN, THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 243 
The statute indicates that Wisconsin is among the states previously 
described that follows a strict no-modification approach, meaning if any part of 
a non-compete agreement is determined to be unreasonable, the entire 
agreement is void.38 
Wisconsin case law has provided additional clarity on, and standards for, 
the statute’s application.  In Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, the court determined 
that the Wisconsin statute reflects a strong public policy against the 
enforcement of unreasonable trade restraints on employees.39  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court further established that courts will only enforce non-compete 
agreements if they (1) are necessary to protect the employer; (2) provide a 
reasonable time limit; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) are not harsh 
or oppressive to the employee; and (5) are not contrary to public policy.40 
Subsequent cases broke these five Lakeside elements down and further 
framed reasonableness in the context of non-competes.  As for the first element, 
the court in Lakeside said: “An employer is not entitled to be protected against 
legitimate and ordinary competition of the type that a stranger could give.  
There must be some additional special facts and circumstances which render 
the restrictive covenant reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
employer’s business.”41  In Wausau Medical Center, S.C. v. Asplund, the court 
held that non-compete agreements are more likely to be necessary for the 
employer’s protection if following factors exist: the business is based on 
customer contacts; the employee has access to confidential information; the 
employee’s reputation was established through work with the former employer; 
and the employee obtained unique skills through the work with the former 
employer.42   
With respect to time limits, the second Lakeside element, reasonableness 
depends on the period required to “obliterate” the customer’s identification of 
the employee with the employer.43  Many cases have indicated that two years 
or less is reasonable.44  Moving to the third element, courts have confined 
territorial limits by considering the area of the employer’s business, especially 
with respect to where the employee works, the nature of the employer’s 
products, and any other factors the court deems relevant.45 
 
38. See id. 
39. 8 Wis. 2d 157, 162, 98 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (1959). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 163. 
42. 182 Wis. 2d 274, 287–90, 514 N.W.2d 34, 40–41 (Ct. App. 1994). 
43. Lakeside, 8 Wis. 2d at 164–65. 
44. See Chuck Wagon Catering, Inc. v. Raduege, 88 Wis. 2d 740, 754, 277 N.W.2d 787, 793 
(1979); Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 103 Wis. 2d 465, 479, 309 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Ct. App. 
1981). 
45. Lakeside, 8 Wis. 2d at 165–66. 
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To determine if a non-compete is harsh or oppressive on an employee, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. 
Hamilton evaluated the extent to which a non-compete inhibited the employee’s 
ability to “pursue a livelihood in that enterprise, as well as the particular skills, 
abilities, and experience of the employee sought to be restrained.”46  The court 
here continued by emphasizing the factors it listed could not be exhaustive, and 
the reasonableness of the fourth Lakeside element must be considered with the 
totality of the circumstances in mind.47  Finally, as to the last Lakeside element, 
public policy can generally be expressed by statute, administrative regulation, 
or by courts through the establishment of common law.48  Public policy with 
respect to non-compete agreements in Wisconsin is framed primarily by 
common law, with courts considering whether enforcing the agreement would 
stifle competition and create a shortage of employees based on previous 
decisions.49 
In addition to the Wisconsin statutory requirements and the case law 
thereunder, the state’s Supreme Court applies the following canons of 
constructing to non-compete agreements: “(1) [non-compete agreements] are 
prima facie suspect; (2) they must withstand close scrutiny to pass legal muster 
as being reasonable; (3) they will not be construed to extend beyond their proper 
import or further than the language of the contract absolutely requires; and (4) 
they are to be construed in favor of the employee.”50 
While non-compete agreements typically have three provisions,51 section 
103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes appears to have been drafted with only the 
noncompetition provision in mind.52  With respect to the non-solicitation and 
confidentiality provisions, Wisconsin law presents a confusing picture.53   
Non-solicitation provisions within non-compete agreements are still 
governed by section 103.465, which requires an express territorial limitation 
for the agreement to be reasonable.54  In operation, however, customer 
 
46. 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 752, 757 (1981). 
47. Id. 
48. Heyde Companies, Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, ¶ 10, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 
N.W.2d 830.  
49. Lakeside, 8 Wis. 2d at 166–67. 
50. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶ 9, 243 Wis. 2d 305, 
627 N.W.2d 444. 
51. Non-compete agreements typically have noncompetition, non-solicitation, and 
confidentiality provisions.  Orelup & Drewry, supra note 28, at 29. 
52. James W. McNeilly, Jr. & Darla A Krzoska, Protecting Business Interests with Covenants 
Not to Compete, WIS. LAW., May 2006, at 12, 60. 
53. Id. 
54. Bradden C. Backer & John J. Kalter, Wisconsin Courts Struggle with Geography in 
Nonsolicitation Agreements, WIS. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 10, 10, 60 n.2. 
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limitations only implicitly set territorial limitations.55  “The customers subject 
to a [non-solicitation provision] conduct business with the employer within a 
defined, albeit changing, territory.  The absence of an explicit territorial 
limitation, accordingly, does not leave the [non-solicitation provision] with an 
unlimited geographic scope.”56  Following its decision in Chuck Wagon 
Catering Inc. v. Raduege,57 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted 
customer limitations as reasonable, the court entertained arguments in Farm 
Credit Services of North Central Wisconsin, ACA v. Wysocki and Equity 
Enterprises Inc. v. Milosch that challenged the territorial scope of customer 
limitations in non-solicitation clauses, and made conflicting decisions.58  The 
decisions in these cases have created confusion among practitioners as to 
whether territorial limitations are needed separately from express customer 
limitations.59 
Confidentiality provisions under Wisconsin non-compete law also create 
confusion in practice.  With the exception of agreements also protecting 
intellectual property,60 agreements protecting information that qualifies as a 
trade secret61 and information that does not so qualify, are also subject to section 
 
55. Id. at 12. 
56. Id. at 12–13. 
57. 88 Wis. 2d 740, 277 N.W. 2d 787 (1979).  In this case, the court upheld a non-solicitation 
provision that prohibited an employee from soliciting customers along the same delivery route of his 
employer, though there was no territorial limitation per se.  Id. at, 745–47, 757.  The court stated, “[i]n 
Wisconsin a [non-compete agreement] is considered reasonable as to territory if, like this [agreement], 
it is limited to the route or customers defendant actually services.”  Id. at 754. 
58. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶ 1, 243 Wis. 2d 305, 
627 N.W.2d 444 (finding that a non-solicitation provision that prohibited an employee from 
performing services for customers the employee serviced for a set period was not invalid on its face 
because the covenant was narrowly tailored to a customer list).  Equity Enters. Inc. v. Milosch, 2001 
WI App 186, ¶ 15, 247 Wis. 2d 172, 633 N.W.2d 662 (ruling against a non-solicitation provision that 
prohibited the employee from doing business with any customer of the employer for a period by 
faulting the provision’s lack of territorial limit). 
59. McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 58.  
60. See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The parties have 
not cited, and we have not found, any Wisconsin statute or decision subjecting non-disclosure 
agreements between suppliers and users of intellectual property to the rules that govern non-
competition clauses between employers and employees.  To the contrary, . . . [s]ection 134.90(6)(b)1 
implies that contracts about intellectual property are valid, even when they exceed the domain of trade 
secrets.”). 
61. According to Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret means “information, 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process to which all 
of the following apply: (1) The information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; (2) The information is the subject 
of efforts to maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the circumstances.”  WIS. STAT. § 134.90(c) 
(2017–2018). 
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103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes and the five-part Lakeside test.62  Under 
Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, however, trade secrets are protected 
without respect to time or territorial limits.63  Yet, under section 103.465, if 
trade secrets and information that does not qualify as a trade secret are protected 
under a single clause without time and territorial limits, the agreement is 
unreasonable and, therefore, void in its entirety.64  Information that does not 
qualify as a trade secret65 is not always easy to distinguish from information 
that does and can present a threat to the employer from anywhere in the world 
for an extended period of time.66  Therefore, in the interest of the employer, 
non-trade secret information should never be disclosed, yet non-compete 
agreements without a time limit are per se unreasonable.67  The confusion, then, 
rests in making agreements that fully protect the employer’s proprietary 
information from competitors, but also complies with section 103.465 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.68 
Some may argue that confidentiality provisions in non-compete agreements 
should simply be supplemented with non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), but 
in practice, this solution provides less protection for an employer.69  While 
NDAs are common, their compliance is far more difficult to track than non-
competes, as it is easier to determine whether a former employee is working for 
another company than to establish that an employee is sharing confidential 
information.70  Furthermore, Wisconsin has not ruled on whether the inevitable 
 
62. McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57.  
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. This can include any information under the wide umbrella of confidential information that is 
not considered a trade secret under section 134.90 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  See § 134.90.  The 
process of determining whether information is a trade secret under section 134.90 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes is a fact-intensive process that relies on several factors: (1) extent to which the information is 
known externally; (2) extent to which the information is known internally; (3) measures taken to guard 
secrecy; (4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors; (5) amount of money and 
effort spent developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated.  Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop, 463 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (W.D. Wis. 2006).  Given 
these many factors, a business may have difficulty determining what information may not be a trade 
secret and, therefore, purposely or mistakenly make non-compete agreements protecting both trade 
secret and non-trade secret information with the same language.  
66. McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57–58. 
67. Ralph Anzivino, Drafting Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 499, 529 (2010). 
68. See McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57–58. 
69. See Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?, 
12 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON 39, 42 (2012).  
70. Id. 
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disclosure doctrine, as detailed in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,71 allows an 
employer to prove trade secret misappropriation simply by demonstrating that 
a former employee’s new employment will inevitably lead to disclosure.72  A 
ruling in conjunction with PepsiCo would make the violation of NDAs easier 
to prove.  But since this ruling does not exist and violations of NDAs are harder 
to track, non-compete agreements with confidentiality provisions satisfy the 
information security needs of employers better than non-disclosure agreements. 
To summarize the many intricacies of Wisconsin non-compete law, 
Timothy Nettesheim and Larri Broomfield explain several paradigms in their 
article “Restrictive Covenants and the Wisconsin Service Professional.”73  
Their piece warns practitioners of making agreements broad, restricting 
employees from larger than necessary territories, and forgetting to spell out 
non-solicitation and confidentiality specifics.74  Overall, it is a cautionary tale, 
reflecting the state of non-compete law in Wisconsin.  In Part IV, this Comment 
will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s non-compete law 
further.  But, to understand how these laws must change to attract high-tech 
employers, first the interests of these employers and the policies of other states 
must be thoroughly examined. 
III. HIGH-TECH EMPLOYERS AND NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
“High technology,” or “high tech,” is defined as “scientific technology 
involving the production or use of advanced or sophisticated devices.”75  These 
employers have several attributes: 
First, high tech [employers] are labor intensive rather than 
capital intensive in their production processes; [s]econd, they 
employ a higher percentage of technicians, engineers, and 
scientists than other industries; they are science based and 
consequently apply to the marketplace scientific advances in 
the form of new products and production methods; and third, 
research and development are critical to the continued success 
 
71. 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret 
misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely 
on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”). 
72. Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 954, 967 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
73. Timothy A. Nettesheim & Larri J. Broomfield, Restrictive Covenants and the Wisconsin 
Service Professional, WIS. LAW., Feb. 1993, at 20, 21–23. 
74. Id. 
75. High Technology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/high%20technology [https://perma.cc/9BG4-CZYY] (last visited Oct. 9, 
2019).  
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of high-technology ventures.76   
Employers of this nature are in many industries, such as retail, 
transportation, national defense, and medicine.77  As discussed,78 certain 
manufacturers also rise to this distinction.  These manufacturers focus on 
producing technology with technology, and rely on innovation to drive their 
production of high-tech goods.79  Hubs of these rapidly growing entities have 
sprouted up in places like Silicon Valley, Seattle, Boston, and Austin, just to 
name a few.80  They have unique interests in an ever-advancing field, and the 
states they call home have addressed these interests in different ways—at least 
in the context of non-competes.  This section will discuss high-tech employers 
generally, as the employers on this spectrum have common interests and are 
usually not distinguished in legal contexts. 
A. Interests of High-Tech Employers 
There are two principal interests of high-tech employers, like most 
employers, when they learn an employee is departing: (1) limiting competition 
and (2) protecting secrets.81  Limiting competition, the first of these interests, 
means preventing former employees from creating more competition for the 
employer by working for a competitor or starting their own ventures in the 
industry.82  While anti-competitive practices that restrain trade have long been 
outlawed under U.S. law,83 this primal business instinct nevertheless persists.  
The high-tech industry is a significant source of today’s innovation, 
 
76. WILLIAM W. FALK & THOMAS A. LYSON, HIGH TECH, LOW TECH, NO TECH: RECENT 
INDUSTRIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE IN THE SOUTH 47 (1988). 
77. Id. at 45–47. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15. 
79. What is High-Tech Manufacturing?, EAGLE TECH., https://eagletechnologies.com/what-is-
high-tech-manufacturing/ [https://perma.cc/9VZJ-785D] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).  Examples of these 
employers include, Samsung, Texas Instruments, and Intel.  See Consumer Electronics, SAMSUNG, 
https://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/business-area/consumer-electronics/ 
[https://perma.cc/936T-TYP7] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019); Technology & Manufacturing, TEXAS 
INSTRUMENTS, http://www.ti.com/about-ti/company/technology-manufacturing.html 
[https://perma.cc/D4X4-QTT7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019); Company Overview, INTEL, 
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/company-overview/company-overview.html 
[https://perma.cc/3KT5-XTYE] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). 
80. Karsten Strauss, America’s Biggest Tech Hubs, by the Jobs, FORBES (Jul. 26, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2017/07/26/americas-biggest-tech-hubs-by-the-
jobs/#a0611192f150 [https://perma.cc/K5TP-KHJS]. 
81. Marx & Fleming, supra note 69, at 41–42. 
82. Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 1127, 1149 (2009). 
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (originating from the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890). 
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necessitating large investments in research and development by its players.84  
Investments are made not just in the processes and products, but also in the 
employees who conceive and execute them.85  In addition to the expertise 
gained from on-the-job experience, high-tech employees have been seen to 
benefit from their employer’s provision of long-term mentorship, advanced 
training, and rewards for intellectual curiosity.86  Employees in the high-tech 
industry and the knowledge, or the coherent mix of obtained information and 
experience, they have, therefore, are strategic assets exceptionally valuable to 
a competitor.87   
The second interest of high-tech employers, protecting secrets, follows 
from the first.  In the innovation driven industry, preserving trade secrets and 
other proprietary information allows a high-tech employer to maintain their 
market position and competitive advantage over peers who do not have the 
information.88  Simply put, the more competitors who know the information, 
the lower its value, with the value disappearing entirely when the information 
no longer becomes a relative secret.89  Programs and devices as well as 
manufacturing processes, methods, and techniques that derive value have the 
potential to be trade secrets under Wisconsin law90 if high-tech manufacturers 
take steps to treat them as so.91  Other confidential and proprietary information 
 
84. Agnieszka Zakrzewska-Bielawska, High Technology Company – Concept, Nature, 
Characteristics, in RECENT ADVANCES IN MANAGEMENT, MARKETING, FINANCES 93, 93 (2010). 
85. Id. at 94. 
86. See Andreas Rekdal, 4 Chicago Tech Companies Making Professional Development a 
Priority, BUILT IN CHICAGO (June 8, 2017), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170623110214/https://www.builtinchicago.org/2017/06/07/chicago-
companies-support-professional-development [https://perma.cc/JL3G-SHYG].  
87. Zakrzewska-Bielawska, supra note 84, at 95. 
88. MAGDALENA KOLASA, TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN 
EQUILIBRIUM 8 (2018). 
89. Id. 
90. See WIS. STAT. § 134.90(c) (2017–2018); Daniel C. Norris, Manufacturing a Trade Secret, 
INDUS. TODAY (2014), https://industrytoday.com/article/manufacturing-a-trade-secret/ 
[https://perma.cc/RA28-MXSR] (compelling manufactures to critically examine their manufacturing 
equipment, processes, or systems for enforceable trade secrets).   
91. The Uniform Trade Secret Act requires information to be “subject of efforts to maintain its 
secrecy” in order to qualify as a trade secret.  WIS. STAT. § 134.90.  When considering this element, 
courts consider several factors, including: “(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of 
[the] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in [the] business; 
(3) the extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value 
of the information to [the business] and to [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended 
by [the business] in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information 
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.”  Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 
851, 434 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1989) (quoting Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109 
Wis. 2d 290, 295, 325 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1982)). 
 
KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:52 PM 
250 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:237 
that does not meet the strict statutory guidelines may also be worthy of 
protection.92 
Non-compete agreements serve to promote both interests.  First, they 
restrict the practice of a particular trade in a certain geographic area for a given 
time, which blocks competitors from accessing valuable employees.93  
Competitors will be wary of attempting to hire employees who have pre-
existing non-competes, even if they believe the agreements are unenforceable, 
because of the length of time the new employee will be unable to work and the 
legal fees associated with a potential tortious interference suit.94  Furthermore, 
non-solicitation and confidentiality provisions protect an employer’s 
customers, trade secrets, and other proprietary information, supporting 
employers’ second interest.95  The security of knowing their interests will be 
satisfied when an employee signs a non-compete, allows high-tech employers 
to confidently increase investment in their workforce.96   
Non-compete agreements also have advantages beyond those that address 
a high-tech employer’s interests when an employee moves.  One of the most 
significant of these advantages is that non-competes discourage employees 
from leaving in the first place.97  Understandably, most employees cannot 
afford to abstain from working in their desired trade for one to three years, as 
many non-compete agreements require.98  Even if the employee believes that 
the agreement is unenforceable, the cost of fighting his or her employer’s 
breach of contract suit, would be a significant deterrent.99  However, it is 
uncommon for employees to believe an agreement is unenforceable because the 
regularity of non-competes causes many to assume their validity and forgo the 
use of legal counsel when considering departure.100  By keeping their valuable 
employees, high-tech employers benefit by avoiding costs associated with 
turnover and recruitment.101  Given the plethora of interests non-competes can 
address, state non-compete laws are particularly relevant to high-tech 
employers. 
 
92. See McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57. 
93. Marx & Fleming, supra note 69, at 51. 
94. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Enforcement of Noncompetition Agreements: Protecting Public 
Interests Through an Entrepreneurial Approach, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 483, 489 (2015). 
95. Id. at 488. 
96. Id.  
97. Id. at 489. 
98. Id. 
99. Sullivan, supra note 82, at 1137.  The author compares the litigation of unenforceable non-
compete agreements to a game of chicken.  Id. at 1137–38. 
100. Id. at 1136. 
101. Marx & Fleming, supra note 69, at 51. 
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B. State Non-Compete Law and High-Tech Employers 
As discussed, courts and legislatures have balanced the interests of 
employers and employees, as well as society, when determining the power of 
non-compete agreements in their states.102  While the acceptable degree is 
subject to debate, most can agree that employers should have the right to protect 
themselves from unfair competition.103  Furthermore, some argue that enforcing 
non-competes is essential to preserving one’s freedom to contract.104  This 
being said, there are significant policy concerns surrounding the use of non-
compete agreements.  Namely, the hindrance of an employee’s right to move 
freely in the market.105  Courts have promoted an employee’s right to choose a 
livelihood utilizing his or her own knowledge and skills: 
The average individual employee has little but his labor to sell 
or to use to make a living.  He is often in urgent need of selling 
it and in no position to object to boilerplate [non-compete 
agreements] placed before him to sign.  To him, the right to 
work and support his family is the most important right he 
possesses.106 
While a business may invest more in an employee who has signed a non-
compete,107 if that employee leaves, he or she will be prevented from starting 
new, potentially innovative ventures, which is a disservice to the public and the 
economy.108 
As is the case with many legal issues, a great deal of variation exists among 
non-compete laws in states.  California and North Dakota are the only two states 
to ban them outright,109 while states like Texas and Florida have reputations for 
placing few limits on the use of non-competes.110  For this Comment’s 
 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
103. Pivateau, supra note 94, at 490. 
104. Id. 
105. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, 
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 64 (2013).  This stems, at least in part, from an historic antipathy for 
contracting oneself into involuntary servitude.  Abigail Shechtman Nicandri, Comment, The Growing 
Disfavor of Non-Compete Agreements in the New Economy and Alternative Approaches for Protecting 
Employers’ Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1003, 1004 n.3 (2011). 
106. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1952). 
107. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
108. Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in an Array of Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-
increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-
jobs.html?hpw&rref=business&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/9FFP-ZDN6].  
109. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2019). 
110. Greenhouse, supra note 108. 
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purposes, the decisions of states regarding non-competes in relation to their 
high-tech employer residents is of primary interest.  California and 
Massachusetts are arguably the most relevant to compare.111  The states are each 
home to established hubs of high-tech employers, respectively located in 
Silicon Valley112 and Route 128,113 that benefit from the nearby talent pools of 
San Francisco, Stanford, and Berkeley in California and Boston, Harvard, and 
MIT in Massachusetts.114  The states also have very different non-compete laws, 
with California banning the agreements115 and Massachusetts not.116 
1. California 
First, California.  According to section 16600 of the California Business 
and Professions Code, “every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void,”117 except with regard to the sale of a business.118  The ban is almost as 
old as the state itself and has been repeatedly affirmed, with some courts even 
going as far as to hold employers liable for punitive damages when they are 
found using non-competes.119  When jurisdictional battles arise, and they often 
do given the uncompromising rule, California outright refuses to recognize the 
non-compete laws of other states and rejects choice of law clauses that attempt 
 
111. Another state of interest is Hawaii, as it is the only state to explicitly direct its non-compete 
law at high-tech employers.  In 2015, a bill was signed into law barring non-compete agreements 
“relating to an employee of a technology business.”  2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 516.  The bill defines 
“technology business” as one that “derives the majority of its gross income from sale or license of 
products or services resulting from its software development or information technology development, 
or both.”  Id.  The legislature found non-compete agreements to: 
impede the development of technology businesses within the State by driving 
skilled workers to other jurisdictions and by requiring local technology 
businesses to solicit skilled workers from out of the State.  Eliminating [non-
compete agreements] for employees of technology businesses will stimulate 
Hawaii’s economy by preserving and providing jobs for employees in this sector 
and by providing opportunities for those technology employees to establish new 
technology companies and new job opportunities in the State. 
Id. at 514. 
112. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A 
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 3 (2003). 
113. SUSAN ROSEGRANT & DAVID R. LAMPE, ROUTE 128: LESSONS FROM BOSTON’S HIGH-
TECH COMMUNITY 108 (1992). 
114. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 67. 
115. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019). 
116. See 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 228.  While there are limitations placed on non-compete 
agreements, the states relatively new law does not ban the agreements outright.  Id. 
117. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019). 
118. Id. § 16601. 
119. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 64–65. 
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to move the contract out of the state’s reach.120  The law, and its enforcement, 
reflects the state’s belief that employee mobility is paramount to its economy.121 
One of the greatest drivers of this Golden State economy emerged on the 
strip of land between San Jose and San Francisco now known as Silicon 
Valley.122  There, in the 1940s and 1950s, dean of Stanford’s engineering school 
Fredrick Terman encouraged his Stanford University counterparts to start 
companies, resulting in the beginnings of giants like Hewlett-Packard and 
Varian Associates.123  Over the next several decades, start-ups and established 
technology firms, fueled by the students of nearby universities like Stanford 
and the University of California, Berkeley,124 created a hub of innovation that 
now employs over 1.6 million people and sees more than 19 billion dollars’ 
worth of venture capital investments within its borders.125  One group of 
scholars describes the prevailing philosophy of Silicon Valley as promoting 
“openness, learning, sharing of information, [and] the co-evolution of ideas.”126  
While firms intensely compete, they also learn from each other in the 
“collaborative” Valley with “porous” boundaries between employers.127  An 
engineer in Silicon Valley summed up the local mentality by saying “there’s 
far greater loyalty to one’s craft than to one’s company. A company is just a 
vehicle that allows you to work.”128 
Much can be attributed to Silicon Valley’s success, but some argue 
California’s non-compete law is an essential piece.129  Given the restraints of 
section 16600, employers in Silicon Valley learned early that they were unable 
to contractually prevent their employees from leaving for a competitor or 
starting solo ventures.130  This resulted in high velocity employment, or a “labor 
 
120. Id. at 66.  In addition to rejecting non-compete clauses, courts in California recently began 
also rejecting non-solicitation clauses because they restrain trade.  AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya 
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2018). 
121. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 64. 
122. Francine Hardaway, From the Field: A Short History of Silicon Valley, in MEDIA 
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 367, 367 (Michelle Ferrier & Elizabeth Mays eds., 2017). 
123. Id. 
124. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 67. 
125. Silicon Valley Data, SILICON VALLEY INDICATORS, 
https://siliconvalleyindicators.org/data/ [https://perma.cc/W9QC-DDLH] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
126. Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, & Henry S. Rowen, The 
Silicon Valley Habitat, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 6 (Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, & Henry 
S. Rowen eds., 2000). 
127. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON 
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 2–3 (1994). 
128. Id. at 36. 
129. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 593 (1999). 
130. Id. at 608. 
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market in which job changes are frequent and employees do not expect to ever 
make careers inside a single employer,”131 and an ensuing distribution of 
employee knowledge.132  This reality, some argue, prompted the Valley’s 
unorthodox culture of cooperative competition.133  Furthermore, they argue that 
the spillovers of knowledge caused the hub to repeatedly reset its production 
cycles, resulting in profound innovation.134 
So, is refusing to enforce non-competes all there is to ending fiercely self-
interested and anti-competitive business behavior?  Not quite.  While yes, the 
successes in California are significant, it is not all sunshine, rainbows, and 
collaboration in Silicon Valley.  In 2010, Adobe Systems, Apple, Google, Intel, 
Intuit, and Disney’s Pixar were accused of uncompetitive hiring practices when 
they agreed not to poach one another’s employees.135  The employers settled 
the federal lawsuit quietly,136 but faced criticism when an order rejecting their 
settlement in the class-action suit revealed “‘ample evidence’ that Silicon 
Valley was engaged in ‘an overarching conspiracy’ against its own 
employees.”137  Emails and affidavits unveiled a ring led by Apple Inc. founder 
Steve Jobs that aggressively sought to limit the movement of employees and 
had been doing so successfully for several years.138  A Google executive 
testified that Steve Jobs threatened “war” if a single Apple employee was 
hired.139  Over 64,000 technical employees who were affected by the hiring 
practices were eligible for the class and to receive more than three billion 
dollars collectively in damages.140  While the case is not a reflection of all 
 
131. HYDE, supra note 112, at 3. 
132. Gilson, supra note 129, at 608. 
133. Id. at 608–09.  
134. Id. at 609. 
135. Ben Rooney, Six Tech Giants Settle DOJ Hiring Lawsuit, CNN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2010, 
6:01 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2010/09/24/technology/DOJ_tech_firms_settle_hiring_charges/?iid=EL 
[https://perma.cc/M6TR-65AR].  
136. Id. 
137. David Streitfeld, Court Rejects Deal on Hiring in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/technology/settlement-rejected-in-silicon-valley-hiring-
case.html [https://perma.cc/P3VQ-2PCL].  
138. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2014) (order denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval of settlements).  
139. Id. at *7. 
140. James O’Toole, Silicon Valley Firms Accused of Hiring Conspiracy, CNN BUSINESS (Apr. 
21, 2014, 5:40 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/04/21/technology/enterprise/silicon-valley-
hiring/index.html [https://perma.cc/P7X3-9WR4].  The August order rejected a settlement of 325 
million dollars, but the case was dismissed in September of 2015 following a court accepted settlement.  
In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (order 
granting plaintiff’s motion for final approval of settlement).  According to the settlement website, a 
settlement of 415 million dollars was reached with Adobe, Apple, Google, and Intel in addition to the 
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companies in Silicon Valley, it indicates that non-compete laws do not change 
the interests of firms in limiting competition and protecting secrets. 
2. Massachusetts 
Moving on to Massachusetts.  The governing law in Massachusetts is 
chapter 228 of the 2018 Session Laws.141  However, because the law is 
relatively new and only applies to non-compete agreements entered into on or 
after October 1, 2018,142 it is not the best source to analyze in relation to 
Massachusetts’s seven-decade old tech industry hub.143  Instead, the common 
law traditions that governed Massachusetts’s non-competes pre-October 1, 
2018 must be examined.  Massachusetts courts began by upholding non-
compete agreements on the grounds that contracts made freely should be 
enforced.144  But later, and for much of its modern history, the state followed a 
general rule that the agreement would be enforced if: “(1) it is necessary to 
protect a legitimate business interest of the employer; (2) it is reasonably 
limited in time and space; and (3) it is consonant with the public interest.”145  
 
20-million-dollar settlement reached with the other defendants.  HIGH-TECH EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST 
SETTLEMENT, http://www.hightechemployeelawsuit.com/ [https://perma.cc/Z6XZ-3YBE] (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2019).  
141. 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 228.  This bill was passed after years of debate and reflects a 
compromise between “those who believe [non-competes] should be abolished because they are 
fundamentally unfair to employees and bad for the Massachusetts economy, and those who believe 
[non-competes] serve a legitimate business purpose when used in a reasonable manner.”  Michael 
Rosen, MA Legislature Passes Noncompete Reform Bill, MASS. NONCOMPETE LAW (Aug. 1, 2018), 
http://www.massachusettsnoncompetelaw.com/2018/08/ma-legislature-passes-noncompete-reform-
bill/ [https://perma.cc/H8QB-9T5R].  Section 24L of the act requires non-compete agreements in the 
state to meet eight requirements: (1) be in writing, signed, and expressly state the employee has a right 
to counsel; (2) if entered into after being hired, provide “fair and reasonable consideration independent 
from the continuation of employment”; (3) not be broader than necessary to protect an employer’s 
trade secret, confidential information, and goodwill; (4) not last more than one year; (5) provide a 
reasonable geographic area that does not exceed the area the employee had a material presence in 
during the last two years of employment; (6) provide a reasonable scope that is limited to types of 
services provided by the employee during the last two years of employment; (7) provide a “garden 
leave” clause, which requires the employer to pay fifty-percent of the employee’s highest annualized 
base salary for the restricted period; and (8) “be consonant with public policy.”  2018 Mass. Acts ch. 
228 § 24L(b). 
142. 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 228. 
143. ALAN R. EARLS, ROUTE 128 AND THE BIRTH OF THE AGE OF HIGH TECH 7 (2002). 
144. Laurence H. Reece, III, Employee Non-Competition Agreements and Related Restrictive 
Covenants: A Review and Analysis of Massachusetts Law, 76 MASS. L. REV. 2, 4 (1991); e.g., Becker 
Coll. of Bus. Admin. & Secretarial Sci. v. Gross, 183 N.E. 765, 766 (Mass. 1933). 
145. Reece, supra note 144, at 4; e.g., Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804, 
807 (Mass. 1976) (“It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a [non-compete agreement] will be 
enforced if it ‘is reasonably limited in time and space, and is consonant with the public interest.’” 
(quoting Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Mass. 1961))); Marine 
Contractors Co., Inc. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass. 1974) (“Employee [non-compete 
 
KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  7:52 PM 
256 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:237 
The state construes the agreements against the employer146 and scrutinizes them 
carefully.147   
Massachusetts courts also consider public policy factors when determining 
whether to enforce non-compete agreements.148  In this exercise, courts 
encountered a school of thought that argues high-velocity employment causes 
an over-abundance of start-up companies, which then weakens the base of 
knowledge and prevents industry innovation.149  Scholars Richard Florida and 
Martin Kenney argue: 
Hypermobility . . . creates the vexing condition of individual 
benefits pitted against “social” costs—costs that are passed on 
to other individuals, other firms, or the economy at large.  
These costs can be separated into four related categories: (1) 
the disruption of ongoing [research and development] efforts, 
(2) a sacrifice of “institutional memory,” (3) loss of investment 
and subsequent underinvestment in human resources, and (4) 
extreme career compression leading to high rates of worker 
burnout.150 
While this theory alone has not been entirely persuasive in Massachusetts, 
trial courts pre-chapter 228 generally upheld or modified non-compete 
agreements, consequentially restricting employee movement.151  Furthermore, 
cost prohibitions limited the number of cases that were brought to appellate 
courts, and those that did often went unreported.152 
One area greatly affected by these pre-chapter 228 non-compete decisions 
was Route 128.  This fifty-five mile stretch of highway connecting the Boston 
suburbs from north to south, began as “the Road to Nowhere,” but by the late 
 
agreements] generally are enforceable only to the extent that they are necessary to protect the legitimate 
business interests of the employer.”); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 488 N.E.2d 22, 29 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (“[A]ny [non-compete agreement] is to be enforced only to the extent that it is 
reasonable in time and space, necessary to protect legitimate interests, and not an obstruction of the 
public interest.”). 
146. Sentry Insurance v. Firnstein, 442 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that non-
compete agreements are construed against employers because they are often the result of unequal 
bargaining power and employees rarely understand their implications). 
147. Alexander, 488 N.E.2d at 28 (“Postemployment restraints . . . must be scrutinized carefully 
to see that they go no further than necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate interests, such as trade 
secrets or confidential customer information.”). 
148. Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (“Among 
the questions which courts typically ask are: . . . Is the restraint injurious to the public?”). 
149. See, e.g., RICHARD FLORIDA & MARTIN KENNEY, THE BREAKTHROUGH ILLUSION: 
CORPORATE AMERICA’S FAILURE TO MOVE FROM INNOVATION TO MASS PRODUCTION 87, 91 (1990). 
150. Id. at 91–92. 
151. Christine M. O’Malley, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech Industry: 
Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1225 (1999). 
152. Id. at 1225–26. 
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1950s, it was deemed the “Golden Semicircle.”153  The highway earned this 
name after attracting some of the first modern, suburban industrial parks to its 
perimeter.154  Fueled by Cold War defense spending and the talented minds of 
Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), these 
industrial districts began attracting high-tech employers in the 1950s, including 
Raytheon.155  Over the course of the next three decades, established companies 
as well as startups benefiting from venture capital were producing great 
innovations, especially in the manufacturing of transistors, semiconductors, and 
minicomputers.156  By the 1970s, Route 128 had earned the distinction of being 
the nation’s leading center of electronics innovation.157 
Massachusetts pre-chapter 228 non-compete law fostered an employment 
pattern in Route 128 that was very different from Silicon Valley’s collaborative 
and integrated approach.158  Given the relative strength of non-compete 
agreements, employees in Route 128 were motivated to stay with their 
employer as opposed to joining another or starting their own venture.159  This 
reality encouraged “long-term career patterns, vertical integration, and, 
ultimately, internal rather than districtwide innovation,”160 as well as a “certain 
conservative spirit.”161  It also resulted in secrecy “between companies and their 
customers, suppliers, and competitors, reinforcing a regional culture that 
encourages stability and self-reliance.”162  Many of the initial occupiers of 
Route 128 were research labs funded by defense initiatives and propelled by 
the knowledge of Harvard and MIT graduates.163  Interestingly, as nonprofits, 
theses employers were unlikely to have noncompete agreements, resulting in 
 
153. EARLS, supra note 143, at 9–10, 29. 
154. Id. at 7. 
155. Id. at 7–8.  “Raytheon Company is a technology and innovation leader specializing in 
defense, civil government and cybersecurity solutions.”  Who We Are, RAYTHEON, 
https://www.raytheon.com/ourcompany [https://perma.cc/5H4W-E8YK] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).  
The company “provides state-of-the-art electronics, mission systems integration and other capabilities 
in the areas of sensing; effects; and command, control, communications and intelligence systems.”  
What We Do, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/au/capabilities [https://perma.cc/L897-S2XZ] 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
156. EARLS, supra note 143, at 8. 
157. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 17. 
158. Gilson, supra note 129, at 606. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 68. 
162. AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley Versus Route 128: A Look at How Companies are 
Shaped by the Business and Social Cultures Around Them, INC. (Feb. 1, 1994), 
https://www.inc.com/magazine/19940201/2758.html [https://perma.cc/J56C-4WP2].  
163. Gilson, supra note 129, at 606. 
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many of their employees leaving to start businesses in Route 128.164  So, despite 
the region’s early development by uninhibited employees, the employees of 
these initial employees, the so-called second stage, were constrained by non-
competes.165 
The 1980s marked a peak in Route 128 high-tech production, as the 1990s 
saw new tech hubs across the United States emerge and certain product markets 
become all but eradicated by superior inventions.166  The economic and industry 
downturns resulted in an exodus of some of the region’s tech talent, especially 
to Silicon Valley.167  Some scholars attribute the decline and loss of talent of 
Route 128 to the state’s non-compete law.168  They argue that the relative ease 
with which employers in Route 128 were able to retain their employees limited 
the sharing of knowledge in the region.169  When new technologies emerged, 
employers that made heavy investments in dedicated equipment and specialized 
labor were quickly overwhelmed and unable to adapt.170  Furthermore, the 
isolation of individual employers prevented the collective technological 
learning necessary in the always-innovating industry.171  Those who argue 
Massachusetts’s pre-chapter 228 non-compete law hurt the state’s tech-hub 
specifically cite the region’s failure to recognize the decline of 
minicomputers172 and adapt by transitioning to smaller workstations and 
personal computers, a move companies in Silicon Valley executed 
effectively.173 
However, some argue these examples are inappropriate and reject 
comparisons between California and Massachusetts as indicative of 
Massachusetts’s non-compete law being inferior.174  Christopher Geehern of 
 
164. Id. at 606–07. 
165. Id. at 607. 
166. EARLS, supra note 143, at 8.  The area’s defense contractors were also deeply affected by 
the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the slowing of the space race.  SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 
17.  Raytheon alone laid off forty percent of its workforce.  Id. 
167. Id. at x. 
168. See O’Malley, supra note 151, at 1229. 
169. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 9. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. The minicomputer was introduced in the 1960s as a smaller, cheaper, and more user-
friendly alternative to the room-filling mainframes of the previous decade.  Gordon Bell, Rise and Fall 
of Minicomputers, ENG’G TECH. HISTORY WIKI, https://ethw.org/Rise_and_Fall_of_Minicomputers 
[https://perma.cc/KYY6-NQMJ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).  The system was equipped with a limited 
number of programs to assist businesses with process control and data transmission.  Id. 
173. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 9. 
174. See Greenhouse, supra note 108. 
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Associated Industries of Massachusetts175 asked “[i]f [non-competes] are so 
onerous and burdensome, why aren’t we seeing a significant migration of talent 
away from the companies that use [non-competes] toward the companies that 
don’t use them?”176  He continued by pointing out that “[t]he companies that 
use [non-competes] still attract plenty of the best and brightest.”177  
Furthermore, “Michael Rodrigues, a Democratic state senator from Fall River, 
[MA], said the government should not be interfering in contractual matters like 
[non-competes]. ‘It should be up to the individual employer and the individual 
potential employee among themselves,’ he said.  ‘They’re both adults.’”178 
Clearly, California and Massachusetts have very different non-compete 
laws, and there are numerous views surrounding those law’s effects on each 
state’s respective tech industries.  Perhaps the story of William Shockley may 
put these views in perspective.  Shockley, a Nobel-prize winning physicist, left 
a position on the East Coast for California in the 1950s and became the first to 
produce silicon semiconductors—where Silicon Valley would eventually get 
its name—in the region.179  While brilliant, Shockley lacked social and 
management skills and, within a year of starting his California business, drove 
away eight of his researchers.180  These researchers became known as the 
“traitorous eight,” and two of them would go on to found one of the world’s 
largest and most valuable high-tech manufacturers, Intel.181  It was from branch 
offs like this that Silicon Valley rose to prominence.182  Had Shockley 
established his business in Massachusetts, it is very likely the traitorous eight 
would have signed a non-compete agreement and either been dissuaded from 
being so “traitorous” or unable to start their own ventures nearly as quickly.183  
While many policy considerations go into non-compete law,184 the story of 
Shockley is telling of these laws in practice. 
 
175. Management Team, ASSOCIATED INDUS. OF MASS., https://www.aimnet.org/about-
associated-industries-massachusetts/management-team.cfm [https://perma.cc/F8SU-AT7Q] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019).  
176. Greenhouse, supra note 108. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. William B. Shockley, NOBEL PRIZE, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1956/shockley/biographical/ [https://perma.cc/6HFY-
ULL7] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).    
180. Alex Tabarrok, Non Compete Clauses Reduce Innovation, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (June 
9, 2014, 10:23 AM), https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/06/non-compete-
clauses.html [https://perma.cc/YFR2-2TDJ].  
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. See supra Section III.B. 
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IV. REFORMING WISCONSIN NON-COMPETE LAW TO ATTRACT HIGH-TECH 
EMPLOYERS 
A. Why Wisconsin Law Should Change 
As discussed, section 103.465 provides statutory guidance for non-
competes in Wisconsin, which has been subsequently illuminated by common 
law.185  Agreements that (1) are necessary to protect the employer, provide 
reasonable (2) time and (3) territorial limits, (4) are not harsh or oppressive to 
the employee, and (5) are not contrary to public policy, will generally be 
enforced in Wisconsin.186  These agreements are prima facie suspect, closely 
scrutinized, and construed in favor of the employee.187  These legal realities 
have two implications: (1) Wisconsin non-compete law is more like 
Massachusetts than it is like California,188 and (2) employers must consider 
many factors to draft an enforceable non-compete agreement.189 
While arguments to the contrary may exist from some in Massachusetts,190 
an analysis of California and Massachusetts non-compete law demonstrates that 
eliminating the use of non-competes creates high-velocity employment that 
benefits high-tech employers because of the industry’s constant need to 
innovate and adapt.191  With laws that complement the employee-restrictive 
doctrines of Massachusetts and conflict with the free-market theories of 
California, Wisconsin non-compete law does not currently offer a suitable 
environment for immense growth of high-tech manufacturing. 
The large and detailed body of Wisconsin non-compete common law has 
prompted the creation of many advisory articles for attorneys in the state.192  As 
a whole, the process requires precision and specificity,193 but even then, if any 
 
185. See supra Section II.B. 
186. Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 161–62, 98 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (1959). 
187. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶ 9, 243 Wis. 2d 305, 
627 N.W.2d 444. 
188. Both Massachusetts and Wisconsin require that non-competes protect legitimate business 
interests and have reasonable time and territorial restrictions.  See supra text accompanying notes 40 
and 144.  The states also consider public policy, scrutinize the agreements carefully, and favor 
employees.  See supra text accompanying notes 40, 50, 145–46.  Unlike California, Wisconsin does 
not presumptively void non-compete agreements.  See supra text accompanying notes 38 and 116. 
189. Sara J. Ackerman, Restrictive Covenants in Employment: Drafting Enforceable 
Agreements, STATE BAR OF WIS.: ROTUNDA REPORT (Jan. 16, 2013), 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/RotundaReport/Pages/Article.aspx?ArticleID=10494 
[https://perma.cc/NQ7B-BTUB].  
190. See supra text accompanying notes 173–77. 
191. See supra Section III.B. 
192. See, e.g., Anzivino, supra note 67, at 499; Nettesheim & Broomfield, supra note 73, at 20; 
Ackerman, supra note 189. 
193. See Ackerman, supra note 189. 
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provision or clause of the non-compete is deemed unreasonable, the entire 
agreement is void.194  With regard to non-solicitation and confidentiality 
clauses, serious confusion exists in practice, making the threat of a void 
agreement even more significant.195  For example, it is unclear if non-
solicitation clauses can set territorial limits implicitly by setting customer 
limits.196  Confidentiality agreements are difficult to navigate because the 
protection of proprietary information is subject to time and territorial limits, 
even though the information can do damage to an employer indefinitely and 
from anywhere.197  Given these difficulties associated with drafting non-
compete agreements, high-tech employers considering Wisconsin may lack the 
confidence that their interests will be protected.198 
Wisconsin non-compete law should change not only because of the flaws 
in its current design, but also because of the state’s ripeness for tech growth.  
CBRE, the largest commercial real estate services and investment firm of its 
kind,199 ranked Madison, Wisconsin first on its list of tech talent momentum 
markets in the company’s 2017 Scoring Tech Talent Report.200  The report 
credited Madison’s labor pool growth,201 high number of millennial 
residents,202 and well-educated populace203 for its tech success.  With a 
comparable university system and cost structure to Madison, Milwaukee’s tech-
market has also shown promising signs.204  According to a report titled 
“Milwaukee’s Tech Talent Impact,” Wisconsin’s largest city boasts “a sizeable 
base of technology talent that consists of nearly 76,000 workers and supports 
 
194. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2015–2016). 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 51–67. 
196. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67. 
198. See supra Section III.A. 
199. CBRE #1 Real Estate Company on Fortune’s Most Admired List, CBRE (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.cbre.com/about/media-center/fortune-most-admired-list-2019 [https://perma.cc/6BR9-
WKWQ].   
200. Madison Named Top City for Tech Talent Growth, Ranking #1 on CBRE’s Annual List of 
Tech Momentum Markets, CBRE (July 19, 2017), https://www.cbre.us/about/media-center/madison-
named-top-city-for-tech-talent-growth-ranking-1-cbre-annual-list-tech-momentum-markets 
[https://perma.cc/99NQ-24M7].  The report measured the change in tech job growth.  Id. 
201. “Over the past five years, the tech labor pool grew more than 50 percent in the Madison 
area, with jobs in software development, computer systems support and technology engineering.”  Id. 
202. “The population of millennials in their 20s grew by 4,490 (7.3 percent) since 2010, 
accounting for 29.6 percent of total growth in a population of 248,956.”  Id. 
203. “Madison ranks among the top 10 markets in the report for educational attainment - 44.7 
percent of people 25 years old or older have a bachelor’s degree or higher.”  Id. 
204. Stephanie Morse, New Reports Cite Growth of Madison and Milwaukee as Tech 
Employment Clusters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2018/07/27/madison-and-milwaukee-make-
progress-tech-employment-clusters/836093002/ [https://perma.cc/TD4H-MPBH]. 
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more than 140 industries,” contributing more than twenty-seven billion dollars 
to the regional economy.205  Top executives in Milwaukee predict 30,000 job 
openings in the tech industry in the next five years.206  The current growth of 
technology industries in Wisconsin combined with the state’s efforts to develop 
a ready workforce,207 allow non-compete reform to further position Wisconsin 
and its new Wisconn Valley on a national and international stage as a leader in 
technology and innovation. 
B. How Wisconsin Law Should Change 
Reconciling long-standing conflicts between employer, employee, and 
public interests, in addition to making the state hospitable for high-tech 
employers, is no easy task.  However, with a new, more specific statute and 
restrained interpretation, all these interests may be to some degree advanced. 
Based upon an analysis of high-tech employers and Wisconsin’s, 
California’s, and Massachusetts’ non-compete laws, Wisconsin should adopt a 
statute with the following language: 
Agreements not to compete are lawful only between employers 
and their employees who are privy to useful proprietary 
information.  Restrictions regarding scope, time, and territory 
must be specified and reasonable in consonant with public 
policy.  Restrictions regarding information disclosure must be 
specific as to the nature of the obligation and information 
subject to it and must be reasonably necessary to protect the 
employer.  Any agreement, described in this section, imposing 
an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and unenforceable 
even as to any part of the agreement or performance that would 
be a reasonable restraint.208 
Useful proprietary information should be defined in the statute as 
information whose value derives from its secrecy and could cause an employer 
financial harm if disclosed.  Courts should give deference to employers when 
 
205. MILWAUKEE REGIONAL TECH HUB, MILWAUKEE’S TECH TALENT IMPACT: AN OVERVIEW 
OF TECH OCCUPATIONS AND TECH-DEPENDENT INDUSTRIES 1 (2018), 
https://www.multivu.com/players/English/8239954-northwestern-mutual-technology-jobs-
milwaukee-economic-impact-study/docs/Fullreport_1530031313447-1486035915.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WXM3-L6VL].  The report is a “comprehensive study of technology talent and its 
impact on the economy” and the result of a partnership of approximately twenty leading job creators 
in the greater Milwaukee area.  First-of-its-Kind Study Demonstrates Increasing Economic Impact of 
Technology Jobs in the Milwaukee Region, MULTIVU (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.multivu.com/players/English/8239954-northwestern-mutual-technology-jobs-
milwaukee-economic-impact-study/ [https://perma.cc/47QJ-B9ZX].  
206. Morse, supra note 204. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 16–19. 
208. See infra Appendix A. 
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considering whether information fits this definition.  The first sentence of this 
statute and its corresponding deference and interpretation instructions serve two 
purposes: (1) limit the number of employees subject to non-compete 
agreements and (2) secure employer secrets.  The first of these purposes 
promotes employee and public interests, as it allows for more free movement 
in the market than the current Wisconsin statute.  The second serves employers, 
but in a way that protects them from unfair competition rather than the mere 
existence of competition.  The suppression of employee movement by Steve 
Jobs and other executives in Silicon Valley shows that even with a complete 
ban, employers still find a way to promote their interests.209  Thus, a statute 
such as this that allows employers to secure their interests while simultaneously 
promoting employee movement is preferable. 
The second sentence of the proposed statute210 is a nod to the current 
reasonableness standard.211  It is subject to public policy, so courts can adapt 
reasonableness standards as labor markets and public sentiments change in 
ways we have yet to imagine.  As discussed, throughout the history of non-
compete agreements, courts have balanced employer, employee, and public 
interests according to the time period’s norms,212 therefore, this statutory 
provision deviates little from this area of law’s statutory interpretation process.  
Unlike the sentence that precedes it, deference with regard to issues arising 
from the application of this sentence should be given to the employee.  This 
deference instruction is another effort to encourage the free movement of 
employees. 
The third sentence213 attempts to resolve the current confusion with non-
solicitation and confidentiality clauses214 by separating the reasonable scope, 
time, and geography standards from the protection of information.  This 
separation gives employers as much protection as possible, while also 
preventing them from keeping employees out of the market and imposing 
overly broad restrictions.  Furthermore, it incorporates another Lakeside 
element215 by necessitating that the protection of the information be necessary 
to the employer. 
 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 135–39. 
210. See infra Appendix A (“Restrictions regarding scope, time, and territory must be specified 
and reasonable in consonant with public policy.”). 
211. See supra text accompanying notes 37–45. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 27–30. 
213. See infra Appendix A (“Restrictions regarding information disclosure must be specific as 
to the nature of the obligation and information subject to it and must be reasonably necessary to protect 
the employer.”). 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 51–67. 
215. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
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The final sentence of the proposed statute is essentially identical to the final 
sentence of section 103.465.216  The sentence forces the court to find the entire 
agreement unenforceable even if only one part is unreasonable.  Allowing the 
court to enforce certain portions of the agreement while striking others results 
in a “blue pencil” rule.217  Wisconsin followed the blue pencil rule in Fullerton 
Lumber Co. v. Torborg,218 but after the case, the legislature wanted a restraint 
containing overly broad and invalid provisions to be struck down in its entirety 
and adopted section 103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes.219  Critics of the blue 
pencil rule argue that allowing courts to modify agreements intrudes on matters 
that should be negotiated between parties, turning judges into attorneys after 
the fact and leaving parties with an agreement neither consented to.220  Given 
the strength of blue pencil criticisms and Wisconsin’s very clear desire to rid 
the state of the doctrine, this proposed statute does not alter the state’s response 
to unenforceable non-compete provisions, even though invalidating only what 
is unreasonable would make employers feel more secure. 
A tech hub is not just a collection of employers; it is also a collection of 
employees, supported by the public.  A state can get as many tech employers to 
set up shop as it wants, but it will be completely devoid of the benefits if 
employees have no interest in the state’s legal climate.  This statute recognizes 
the interdependence of employers, employees, and the public and succeeds in 
advancing each one’s general interests. 
 
216. Compare infra Appendix A (“Any agreement, described in this section, imposing an 
unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and unenforceable even as to any part of the agreement or 
performance that would be a reasonable restraint.”), with WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2015–2016) (“Any 
covenant, described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and 
unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint.”). 
217. William T. Rosenbaum, Note, Ohio Puts Away Its Blue Pencil, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 99, 100 
(1976). 
218. 270 Wis. 133,  144, 147–48, 70 N.W.2d 585, 586, 592 (1955) (concluding that a ten-year 
restrictive covenant was unreasonable, but by editing the contract, it deemed the covenant enforceable 
for three years). 
219. Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 608, 348 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1984) 
(“In 1957 after the . . . Fullerton Lumber case, the legislature adopted [section] 103.465 at the 
suggestion of a legislator who was critical of the Fullerton Lumber decision.”).  The court confirmed 
its abandonment of the blue pencil doctrine in Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra.  2009 WI 76, ¶ 76, 319 Wis. 
2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898 (“Though the question was withheld in Streiff, we now make clear that we 
believe the legislative history and text of the statute do not eliminate or modify the common law rules 
on divisibility.  The statute’s prescriptions support this as they apply to any ‘covenant,’ not to the whole 
employment contract.  It specifies that if a restraint is unreasonable, the rest of that covenant is also 
unenforceable.”). 
220. See, e.g., Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for 
Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 674 (2007). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the push for high-tech manufacturing jobs continues, states with 
attractive legal climates will accrue great benefits.  Wisconsin has already 
attracted one tech giant in Foxconn but can do more to foster an environment 
suitable for the high-tech industry by reforming its non-compete law.  The high-
tech world is one of constant innovation, necessitating the relatively free flow 
of innovators.  Fortunately, it is possible through new and specific statutory 
language, as well as judicial restraint in the application of this language, for 
high-tech employees to move relatively freely while still protecting employers 
from the loss of their valuable confidential information.  By reconciling the 
interests of employers, employees, and the public with non-compete law 
reform, Wisconsin may just turn the Wisconn Valley into the next Silicon 
Valley. 
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED WISCONSIN STATUTE 
Agreements not to compete are lawful only between employers and their 
employees who are privy to useful proprietary information.  Restrictions 
regarding scope, time, and territory must be specified and reasonable in 
consonant with public policy.  Restrictions regarding information disclosure 
must be specific as to the nature of the obligation and information subject to it 
and must be reasonably necessary to protect the employer.  Any agreement, 
described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and 
unenforceable even as to any part of the agreement or performance that would 
be a reasonable restraint. 
 
